

## **India-Iran Relations: A Strategic Partnership Between Civilizational Connect and Geopolitical Challenges**

**Dr. Mad Javed Khan**

**Deptt. of Political Science**

**B.N.M. College, Badhiya, Munger University, Munger**

**Abstract:** Article provides a comprehensive analysis of the bilateral relationship between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Iran, two nations with civilizational ties spanning millennia. It examines the historical evolution of diplomatic relations from the 1950 Friendship Treaty to the present day, the strategic importance of connectivity projects like the Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), the dramatic decline in trade due to US sanctions, recent high-level diplomatic engagements, and the complex geopolitical balancing act India faces between its strategic autonomy and its deepening partnership with the United States.

**Keywords:** India-Iran relations, Chabahar Port, International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), US sanctions, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), strategic autonomy, connectivity, crude oil imports, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Gulf region, diplomatic history.

### **1. Introduction: Millennia of Shared Civilizational Heritage**

India and Iran share a relationship that predates modern nation-states by thousands of years. The cultural and linguistic ties between the Indian subcontinent and the Iranian Plateau date back to ancient times, with profound exchanges in language, literature, art, and architecture. Persian culture has left an indelible mark on South Asian civilization, particularly in the realms of poetry, cuisine, and administrative systems during the Mughal period <sup>9</sup>. Even today, around 15% of India's Muslim population follows the Shia tradition, for whom Iran considers itself a representative on the world stage <sup>9</sup>.

In the contemporary context, India and Iran established formal diplomatic relations on 15 March 1950 with the signing of a Friendship Treaty, reflecting Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's policy of non-alignment and mutual regional cooperation <sup>1-5</sup>. This laid the foundation for a relationship that would navigate the complexities of the Cold War, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the post-Cold War unipolar moment, evolving into a strategic partnership built on shared interests in regional stability, connectivity, and economic cooperation <sup>5</sup>.

### **2. Historical Evolution of Diplomatic Ties**

#### **2.1 The Cold War Era and the 1979 Revolution**

During much of the Cold War, relations between India and the erstwhile Imperial State of Iran were constrained by their differing geopolitical alignments. India maintained a non-aligned position while fostering strong links with the Soviet Union, whereas Iran under the Shah was a staunch member of the Western Bloc with close ties to the United States <sup>5-9</sup>. The Shah's inclinations towards Washington and his efforts to establish close relations with Pakistan meant there was no significant strategic alignment with New Delhi <sup>5</sup>.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution marked a watershed moment. The uprising that deposed the Shah and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power reshaped not only Iran's domestic politics but also the entire balance of power in West Asia <sup>5</sup>. While the new clerical regime initially dissociated itself from both Cold War blocs, it extended its hand towards the Non-Aligned Movement, of which India was a founder member <sup>5</sup>. What worked in India's favour was Iran's distancing from Pakistan, which was a formal strategic ally of the US at the time <sup>5</sup>.

However, the relationship was not without complications. India's neutral position during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) forced it to shift oil purchases to other Gulf countries, but it continued to build working economic and political relations with Iran 5. Significantly, Iran was instrumental in raising frequent objections to Pakistan's anti-India resolutions in forums such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) 5-9.

## **2.2 The Afghan Factor: A Common Strategic Interest**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought out the nuanced dynamics of Iran's evolving relations with India and Pakistan. While Iran's clerical regime opposed the invasion and coordinated covert support for the Afghan mujahideen with Pakistan throughout the 1980s, it also worked with Russia and India in supporting the Northern Alliance to limit the influence of the Pakistan-backed Taliban forces in the 1990s 5.

In the 1990s, both India and Iran supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan 9. They continued to collaborate in supporting the broad-based anti-Taliban government, led by Ashraf Ghani and backed by the international community, until the Taliban captured Kabul in 2021 and re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 9. India also views Iran as its only corridor for land access to Afghanistan, through which most of its development and reconstruction assistance to that country is routed – a historic mission in which India and the United States share a deep convergence of interests 8.

## **3. The Strategic Partnership Takes Shape**

### **3.1 Post-Cold War Rapprochement**

The end of the Cold War in 1991 saw both countries move closer, with Iran adopting a "Look to the East" policy towards Asian countries while India attempted to assert its position as an emerging world power 5. In a July 2025 brief for the National University of Singapore's Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), researcher Sandeep Bhardwaj explained: "At a deeper level, developing relations with Iran allowed India to expand its options. Protective of its strategic autonomy, New Delhi was discomfited by the post-1991 American hegemony over the world. It sought to retain greater manoeuvre room for itself by signalling its willingness to work with nations ostracised by the United States (US)-led Western order" 5.

In 1993, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao visited Tehran, with discussions focusing on two major points: the construction of a pipeline to supply Iranian gas to India, and enabling India to build transit facilities in Iran for supplying Indian goods to landlocked Central Asian countries 5. When Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited India two years later, the signing of a major trade accord and five bilateral agreements confirmed the consolidation of bilateral ties 5.

### **3.2 The Tehran and New Delhi Declarations**

India-Iran cooperation deepened significantly around the turn of the millennium. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's April 2001 visit to Iran saw the signing of the Tehran Declaration, and the return visit of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in January 2003 – where he was the Chief Guest during India's Republic Day parade – led to the New Delhi Declaration 1-5. This heralded the elevation of the relationship to a strategic partnership "for a more stable, secure and prosperous region and for enhanced regional and global cooperation" 5. The two documents identified areas of cooperation and set the strategic vision for the partnership 1. Another significant provision of the Declaration was to enhance bilateral defence cooperation, and the two countries signed a defence cooperation agreement in December 2002 5-9.

## **4. Connectivity Paradigm: Chabahar Port and INSTC**

### **4.1 The Strategic Importance of Chabahar**

The Chabahar Port, located on the Gulf of Oman in Iran's Sistan-Baluchistan province, is arguably the most significant strategic project in the India-Iran bilateral relationship. The port serves as a crucial trade hub providing India direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan <sup>3</sup>. It is seen as a way of countering Chinese influence in the region, which built the Gwadar port in Pakistan's Balochistan province that borders Iran <sup>5</sup>.

India's involvement with Chabahar began in 2015 with an MoU to partner on the development of the port <sup>6</sup>. By May 2016, during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Iran, it was elevated to a trilateral agreement between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to establish the International Transport and Transit Corridor (Chabahar Agreement) <sup>1-6</sup>. India Ports Global Chabahar Free Zone (IPGCFZ), a unit of India Ports Global Limited (IPGL) formed by Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust and Kandla Port Trust, took over the operations of Chabahar Port in 2018 <sup>6-7</sup>.

#### **4.2 Recent Developments and Investments**

A significant milestone was achieved in May 2024 when India signed a 10-year contract with Iran to equip and operate the container and cargo terminals at the Shahid Beheshti Port at Chabahar <sup>3-9</sup>. According to the Shipping Ministry, 400 crore rupees have been allocated for Chabahar since FY 2016-17, with 201.51 crore rupees spent so far <sup>3</sup>.

The Ministry of External Affairs has detailed India's contributions: "The grant assistance for the supply of equipment has been enhanced to \$120 million. India has also committed to providing a Line of Credit of \$250 million in rupee equivalent for the development of Chabahar Port. Since 2018, the port has handled over 450 vessels, 1,34,082 TEUs (Twenty-foot Equivalent) of containerised cargo and more than 8.7 million tons of bulk and general cargo" <sup>7</sup>.

The port recorded a 43 per cent rise in vessel traffic and a 34 per cent increase in container traffic in 2023-24 <sup>3</sup>. Since its operationalization in December 2018, the port has handled cargo from Russia, Brazil, Germany, Bangladesh, Thailand, Romania, UAE, Kuwait, and Australia among other countries <sup>1</sup>.

Analysts note that Chabahar's importance has grown as China scales back Belt and Road Initiative investments, including elements of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, due to debt and security concerns – a shift that could limit Pakistan's leverage in transit talks involving Iran and India <sup>3</sup>.

#### **4.3 International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)**

India is also coordinating as a founding member of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal transportation network aimed at connecting landlocked countries to the sea <sup>1-2</sup>. Two rounds of trilateral meetings have been held between Iran, India, and Uzbekistan on the Joint Use of Chabahar Port in December 2020 and December 2021 <sup>1</sup>. During political consultations in Tehran in March 2026, both sides reviewed various aspects of cooperation, including transit routes and the INSTC, with Iran announcing its readiness to cooperate with India on shipping and railway lines <sup>2</sup>.

### **5. Trade Relations: The Rise and Fall**

#### **5.1 The Oil Trade Golden Era**

For many years, oil was the backbone of the India-Iran economic relationship. India depended on Iranian crude oil to meet its growing energy needs, and in return, exported food items, medicines, machinery, and other goods <sup>4</sup>. In 2008-09, Iranian oil accounted for nearly 16.5% of India's crude oil imports, making Iran India's second-largest oil supplier <sup>9</sup>. In 2009, India imported about 22 million tonnes of crude oil worth \$10 billion from Iran <sup>5</sup>. In FY19, just before sanctions took full effect, Iranian crude exports to India stood at \$12 billion <sup>7</sup>.

#### **5.2 The Impact of US Sanctions**

The relationship changed sharply after 2018. The United States, under President Donald Trump's first administration, unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, and reinstated strong sanctions on Iran 4-5. This forced many countries, including India, to reduce economic ties with Iran.

India had previously cut oil imports between 2012 and 2015 amid targeted US sanctions, but the situation worsened after 2018 7. Following the 2015 JCPOA, Indian refiners had ramped up imports from early 2019, but the re-imposition of sanctions forced India to wind down and stop imports of Iranian oil by the summer of 2019 7. India has not imported any Iranian oil since May-June 2019, when the sanctions waiver given by the US to India and a few other countries expired 7.

The impact on overall trade was immediate and dramatic. In 2020, India exported goods worth USD 3.37 billion to Iran and imported goods worth USD 1.39 billion. But by 2021, exports fell to USD 1.77 billion, and imports to just USD 0.33 billion 4. By 2025, India's exports to Iran stood at around USD 1.24 billion, while imports were about USD 0.44 billion 4. Compared to the pre-sanctions era, total trade contracted by nearly 56 per cent 4. Official data shows that direct bilateral goods trade was worth nearly \$1.6 billion in FY25, dramatically lower compared to pre-Covid levels when total trade stood at nearly \$15 billion, largely driven by crude imports 7.

India Today reports that "oil imports from Iran collapsed by 99% since 2008, as the UAE and Saudi Arabia emerged as India's key trade partners" 4. India turned to other suppliers in the Middle East and Russia to meet its energy needs, with countries like Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates becoming more important for India's crude oil imports 4.

### **5.3 Current Trade Composition**

Despite the dramatic decline, trade continues in non-oil sectors. In calendar year 2025, India's merchandise trade with Iran stood at more than \$1 trillion in exports and \$323 million in imports, with a trade balance in India's favour of \$695 million 6. The top export to Iran from India is cereals, especially rice – \$649.4 million worth in 2025 6. Bananas are the next biggest export item at \$44.8 million, followed by tea at \$43.8 million 6. Other major exports include sugar, pharmaceuticals, manmade staple fibres, electrical machinery, and artificial jewellery 1.

Top exports from Iran to India in 2025 included petroleum bitumen at \$110 million, fresh apples at \$60.4 million, and wet dates (khayzur) at \$29 million 6. Other Indian imports from Iran consist of dry fruits, inorganic/organic chemicals, and glassware 1-5.

## **6. High-Level Exchanges and Diplomatic Engagement**

### **6.1 Foundational Visits (2000s-2010s)**

The bilateral relationship has been sustained through regular high-level exchanges. Following the landmark 2001 and 2003 visits, there have been two Speaker-level visits, with Lok Sabha Speaker Meira Kumar visiting Iran in 2011, followed by a return visit by the Speaker of Majlis, Dr. Ali Larijani, to India in 2013 1.

### **6.2 The Modi-Rouhani Era**

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Iran in May 2016 was a significant milestone. During this visit, a joint statement titled "Civilizational Connect, Contemporary Context" was released, and 12 MOUs/Agreements were signed 1. The Trilateral Agreement on Trade, Transport and Transit between India, Iran and Afghanistan was also signed during the visit 1. President Hassan Rouhani visited India in February 2018, during which a joint statement titled "Towards Prosperity Through Greater Connectivity" was issued 1. The two sides signed 13 MOUs/Agreements during the visit, prominent among them being the contract for

interim operations of Chabahar port and the MoU on Cooperation in the Field of Health and Medicine -1.

### **6.3 Recent Exchanges (2021-2026)**

In 2021, External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar visited Tehran in July and August and called on President Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi, becoming the first foreign dignitary to call on President Raisi following his election -1. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian visited India in June 2022 and called on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during which the MLAT on Civil and Commercial Matters was signed -1.

In August 2022, Sarbananda Sonowal, Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, visited Iran, during which an MoU on Recognition of Certificates of Competency in Unlimited Voyages was signed -1. Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, visited India in November 2021 for the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan -1.

Prime Minister Modi and President Raisi met for the first time on the sidelines of the SCO Heads of State Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan in September 2022, during which both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral cooperation, especially in trade and connectivity -1.

In September 2025, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval spoke with his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, to discuss regional developments and cooperation, including the Chabahar project -3. In March 2026, political consultations were held in Tehran between delegations led by Director General for South Asia at Iran's MFA Mohammad Reza Bahrami and Regional Director General at India's MEA Anand Prakash, with both sides agreeing on removing obstacles to expanding bilateral relations and exchanging economic delegations -2.

### **7. Institutional Mechanisms for Cooperation**

The two countries have established several bilateral consultative mechanisms at various levels to facilitate ongoing cooperation -1:

- **Joint Committee Meeting (JCM)**
- **Foreign Office Consultations (FOC)**
- **Security Consultations** at the level of National Security Advisers and Deputy National Security Advisers
- **Joint Consular Committee Meeting (JCCM)**
- **Joint Working Groups** to facilitate cooperation in various important sectors

Cooperation also extends to law enforcement agencies, with a bilateral meeting held between India's Narcotics Control Bureau and Iran's Anti-Narcotics Police in May 2022 on anti-narcotics cooperation -1. Both countries engage at multilateral forums including the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) -1.

### **8. Humanitarian Cooperation**

India and Iran closely cooperated during the COVID-19 pandemic, with India providing 1,125,000 doses of vaccines and medical supplies to Iran -1. India also provided Malathion insecticide to Iran in 2020 and 2021 to combat desert locusts -1. Earlier, India had provided 103 tons of disaster relief aid to Iran during the 2019 floods -1.

### **9. Geopolitical Challenges and Complexities**

#### **9.1 The Nuclear Issue and India's Balancing Act**

India's position on Iran's nuclear program has been consistent: Iran must cooperate with the IAEA to address and resolve all outstanding issues about its nuclear program -8. India believes that while Iran has rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it must simultaneously and rigorously fulfil its treaty obligations -8. A 2010 press release from India's Embassy in Washington DC emphasized that India has "scrupulously adhered to the multilateral sanctions against Iran as mandated by the United Nations" -8.

However, this has created tensions. In 2005, India voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency, which took Iran by surprise -9. Ali Larijani reportedly said, "India was our friend" -9. Stephen Rademaker later acknowledged that India's votes against Iran at the IAEA were "coerced" by the United States -9. The US considered support from India crucial in getting a sizeable majority for its proposal to refer the matter to the Security Council -9.

### **9.2 The Pakistan Factor**

India-Iran relations have long served as a counterbalance to Pakistan's influence in the region -9. Unlike Islamabad, Tehran has supported New Delhi's ambitions, notably by facilitating access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the Chabahar Port -9. Historically, Iran shielded India from international censure over Kashmir at the OIC in 1994, refusing to back a Pakistan-driven resolution -9.

However, the relationship has faced strains. In 2010, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appealed to Muslims worldwide to back the freedom struggle in Kashmir, prompting India to summon the acting Iranian ambassador in New Delhi to lodge a formal protest -9. In July 2017, just before Prime Minister Modi's visit to Israel, Khamenei again urged Muslims in Kashmir to 'repudiate oppressors' -9. In September 2024, Khamenei raised the issue of the "suffering" of Muslims in India, leading to condemnation from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, which called on Iran to "look at [its] own record" on minority rights -9.

In July 2025, the Iranian Embassy in India publicly warned of a coordinated misinformation campaign aimed at damaging India-Iran relations, allegedly orchestrated through fake social media accounts – some of which appeared to originate from Pakistan -9. These impersonator accounts spread false claims such as Iran reconsidering the Chabahar Port agreement with India -9.

### **9.3 The US Factor: A Growing Constraint**

Perhaps the most significant challenge to India-Iran relations has been the United States. As researcher Sandeep Bhardwaj notes, the US pressure campaign has effectively "whittled India-Iran relations to a nub" and most commercial and infrastructure projects have stalled or died -5. Even the Chabahar project, which managed to survive, has "failed to take off due to sanctions – only 450 vessels have visited it in the last six years" -5.

In January 2026, President Trump announced that any country doing business with Iran would immediately face a 25 per cent tariff on all trade with the US -4-7. This announcement has created fresh headwinds for India's exports of low-margin products, particularly tea and rice -7. India is already facing 50 per cent tariffs on its exports to the US, and additional tariffs could harm exporters, especially in labour-intensive sectors like textiles -6.

Tea exporters have stated that Iran has traditionally been a strong market for Indian orthodox tea, and the new tariffs could exacerbate restrictions that tea exporters are facing in other markets -7.

### **9.4 Differing Foreign Policy Perspectives**

Despite common strategic interests, India and Iran differ significantly on key foreign policy issues. India has expressed strong opposition to Iran's nuclear program and supported the

presence of NATO-led forces in Afghanistan, unlike Iran <sup>-9</sup>. India has also consistently voiced stronger support for Israel than for Iran in the 2020s <sup>-9</sup>.

## **10. Current Status and Future Prospects**

### **10.1 The State of Play in 2026**

As of March 2026, the India-Iran relationship presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, diplomatic engagement continues, with regular consultations and a shared interest in connectivity projects <sup>-2</sup>. On the other hand, economic ties remain at a fraction of their pre-sanctions levels, with oil imports virtually non-existent and total trade hovering around \$1.6 billion annually <sup>-7</sup>.

The passing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on March 1, 2026, following strikes conducted by the US and Israel in Tehran, has introduced a new set of uncertainties into the mix <sup>-5</sup>. Bhardwaj's assessment offers a sobering portrait of the bilateral relationship as it stands: "Although the economic and strategic rationales for closer India-Iran ties still exist on paper, the two nations have drifted apart in the absence of any concrete link holding them together. New Delhi's inability to navigate Washington's maximum pressure campaign to preserve some degree of its relationship with Tehran hints at the shrinking room for India to manoeuvre geopolitically" <sup>-5</sup>.

### **10.2 Way Forward**

Despite the challenges, both sides continue to explore ways to strengthen relations. During the March 2026 political consultations in Tehran, the two sides agreed on removing obstacles to expanding bilateral relations, exchanging economic delegations, and cooperating in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, and plant quarantine <sup>-2</sup>.

The Chabahar Port remains a bright spot, with both sides committed to its development. As India intensifies its Connect Central Asia policy, the port's strategic importance is likely to grow amid shifting global trade and diplomatic alignments <sup>-3</sup>.

## **11. Conclusion**

India-Iran relations represent a classic case of the tensions between historical ties, strategic interests, and geopolitical constraints. The two nations share a civilizational heritage that spans millennia and have cooperated on critical regional issues, from countering the Taliban in Afghanistan to developing alternative trade routes that bypass Pakistan. The Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor embody the potential of this partnership to reshape regional connectivity.

However, the relationship has been severely constrained by external factors, primarily US sanctions. India's growing strategic partnership with the United States, its energy diversification away from Iranian oil, and its evolving ties with Israel and Gulf Arab states have all contributed to a gradual drift in the bilateral relationship. The dramatic decline in trade from nearly \$15 billion to just over \$1.6 billion tells the story of unrealized potential.

As Bhardwaj notes, "the economic and strategic rationales for closer India-Iran ties still exist on paper" <sup>-5</sup>. Whether these rationales can be translated into concrete cooperation in the face of continued sanctions, regional instability, and competing geopolitical pressures will determine the future trajectory of this ancient but challenged relationship.

## **References**

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran. (2022, November 21). *Iran - India Relations*. <https://india.mfa.gov.ir/en/ViewPage/15977 -1>
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran. (2026, March 2). *Iran and India explore ways of strengthening relations*. <https://en.mfa.gov.ir/portal/PrintNews/774694 -2>

3. News On AIR. (2025, September 8). *NSA Ajit Doval, Iranian Counterpart Discuss Chabahar, Regional Cooperation*. <https://www.newsonair.gov.in/nsa-ajit-doval-iranian-counterpart-discuss-chabahar-regional-cooperation/> -3
4. India Today. (2026, March 3). *India-Iran trade has declined sharply, oil purchases have all but dried up*. <https://www.indiatoday.in/diu/story/india-iran-trade-has-declined-sharply-oil-purchases-have-all-but-dried-up-2877085-2026-03-03> -4
5. The Indian Express. (2026, March 1). *\*Ayatollah Khamenei dead: How India-Iran ties have fared since the 1979 Iranian Revolution\**. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/ayatollah-khamenei-dead-india-iran-ties-since-revolution-10559257/> -5
6. The Week. (2026, January 13). *Iran-based Trump tariffs may spell trouble for India in trade and maritime*. <https://www.theweek.in/news/maritime/2026/01/13/iran-based-trump-tariffs-may-spell-trouble-for-india-in-trade-and-maritime.html> -6
7. The Indian Express. (2026, January 13). *As Trump targets Iran trade, India's tea exports, Chabahar port investments face fresh headwinds*. <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-economics/india-tea-ice-exports-trump-iran-10470831/> -7
8. Embassy of India, Washington D.C. (2010). *PRESS RELEASE on media reports on Iran*. <https://www.indianembassyusa.gov.in/ArchivesDetails?id=1727> -8
9. Wikipedia. (2026). *India–Iran relations*. [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=India%E2%80%93Iran\\_relations&printable=yes](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=India%E2%80%93Iran_relations&printable=yes) -9
10. Bhardwaj, S. (2025, July). *India-Iran Relations: From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Drift*. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. [Cited in citation:5]
11. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2024). *\*Annual Report 2023-24\**. [Cited in citation:7]
12. Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2024, May). *\*India and Iran Sign 10-Year Contract for Chabahar Port Operations\**. [Cited in citation:3]-7
13. Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India. (2025). *Chabahar Port Development: Progress Report*. [Cited in citation:3]
14. Reserve Bank of India. (2010, November 27). *Circular on Transactions with Iran*. [Cited in citation:9]
15. The New York Times. (2005). *US Official on India's IAEA Vote*. [Cited in citation:9]
16. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2024, September). *Official Statement on Remarks by Iranian Supreme Leader*. [Cited in citation:9]